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[Crim. No. 10930. In Bank. July 28,1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ODIE 
WILLARD COFFEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Amendment: Review 
as A1fected by Record: Disposition of Cause.-A eourt'a 
attempt to retlect its grant of an ambiguous prosecution 
motion "'to strike the allegations of the Deadly Weapons Sec-
tion" resulted in a record so confused as to require reversal of 
the judgment with directions to undertake again all proceed-
ings subsequent to entry of the verdict as may be necessary 
where, after the accused had been found guilty on two counts 
of assault with intent to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 217), and 
four counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon the police 
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b», all committed with an unlicensed 
eoneealable weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022), the information and 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1031, 1157, 1446 
(1); [2] Criminal Law, §§ 1157, 1305; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 107, 
107(23); [4, 6, 10] Criminal Law, § 1464; [5] Criminal Law, 
§1465; [7,8] Criminal Law, §1463j [9] Criminal Law, §106; 
[11] Witnesses, § 227; [12] Criminal Law, § 1382.2; [13] Criminal 
Law, § 1378; [14] Criminal Law, § 1340; [15] Arrest, § 18; [16] 
Criminal Law, § 1378(0.5); Arrest, § 18; [17] Criminal Law, 
§ 1378(6). 
lIt might also be urged that the toeboard requirement is not only to 
protect persons below from injury due to falling objects but also to pr~ 
tect persons from fulling. In any event, it was error to refuse the offered 
instruction. 
-Retired Associate Justjce of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
t Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council . 
... 
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the abstract of judgment were amended by substituting "dan-
gerous" for "deadly" weapons and "Pen. Code, § 3024" (itself 
relating to "deadly" weapons) for Pen. Code, § 12022," and 
where the information on the other counts, on which sentence 
was merely suspended, was left unchanged. 
[2] Id.-Review as A1rected by Record: Discretion of Court-Sen-
tenciLg.-While a judgment and record remain so confused as 
to render impossible any meaningful analysis of a purported 
exercise of a trial court's discretionary powers as to sentenc-
ing, modification or correction by an appellate court is pre-
cluded. 
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-The right to the 
assistance of counsel at trial, the scope of which was enunci-
ated in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 
799, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733], applies retrospectively 
without regard to time. 
[4] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction 
Is in Issue-Constitutionality.-To the extent that statutory 
machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction is 
activated by the presence of prior convictions, the constitu-
tional basis of such convictions must be examined if challenged 
by proper allegations. 
[5] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings as to Foreign Convic-
tions-Burden of Proving Constitutionality.-To the extent 
that any state makes its penal sanctions depend in part on the 
fact of prior c5nvictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume 
the burden of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such 
prior convictions. 
[6a-6c] Ido-Habitual Ofienders-Proceedings Where Prior Con-
viction Is in Issue-Constitutionality-Determinationo-When 
an accused, prior to trial, raises the issue of the constitution-
ality of a prior conviction, whether by motion to strike the 
prior on constitutional grounds or by denying it on constitu-
tional grounds at the time of entering his plea thereto, the 
court must, prior to trial, hold a hearing outside the presence 
of the jury to determine the constitutional validity of the 
charged prior, and must strike from the accusatory pleading 
any prior conviction found to be constitutionally invalid. 
[7] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Denial of Prior Oonvictions-Consti-
tutional Grounds-Sufficiency of Allegation.-One seeking to 
challenge the charge of a prior conviction on the ground of 
[3] Constitutionally protected right of indigent accused to 
appointment of counsel in state court prosecution, note, 93 A.L.R. 
2d 747. 
[6] See Cal.Juro2d, Witnesses, § 155; Am.Juro, Witnesses (1st 
ed § 747 et seq). 
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constitutional defects as to the right to counsel may do so only 
through a clear allegation to the effect that, in the pt:0ceedings 
leading to the prior conviction under attack, he neither was 
represented by counsel nor waived the right to be so repre-
sented. 
[8a, 8b] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Denial of Prior Oonviction-
Constitutional Grounds-Aid of Counsel ;Denied-Sufficiency 
of Allegation.-A motion to strike a prior foreign conviction 
was sufficient to justify a hearing in the trial court to deter-
mine whether, in the proceedings leading to that conviction, 
defendant had been afforded his right to counsel (U.S. Const., 
6th and 14th Amends.), where the motion was supported by 
clear allegations, in defendant's notice, points and authorities, 
and in his attorney's declaration, that he had not been repre-
sented by counsel in such proceedings and that he had not 
"clearly and expressly and intelligently" waived such right. 
[9] Id.-Rights of Accused-Waiver.-A relinquishment of rights 
unaccompanied by a state of mind capable of appreciating the 
implications and consequences of such action is not a waiver 
of such rights. 
[10] Id.-Habitual Offenders-Proceedings Where Prior Convic-
tion Is in Issue-Burdens of Proof and of Producing Evidence. 
-In a hearing to determine the issue of the constitutionality 
of a defendant's prior conviction, challenged on grounds of the 
infringement of his right to counsel, the burden of proof as to 
constitutionality remains with the prosecution and the prose-
cution .Drst has the burden of proving, prima facie, that such 
conviction was suffered (Pen. Code, § 1025), but the burden of 
producing evidence then shifts to the accused to show the 
infringement (see Evid. Code, § 550), and if such burden is 
borne, the prosecution then has the right to produce evidence 
in rebuttal. 
[11] Witnesses - Impeachment - Prior Unconstitutional Convic-
tions-Error.-The use of a constitutionally invalid prior 
conviction to impeach testimonial credibility is improper, and 
to allow such impeachment is error under California law. 
[12a, 12b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error 
-Evidence of Other Convictions.-The use of a constitu-
tionally invalid prior conviction for any purpose leading to a 
conviction for a subsequent offense is a violation of due 
process under U.S. Const., 14th Amend., and its prejudicial 
effect must be assessed, on appeal, by application of the Chap-
fnan test, namely, whether the prosecution at the subsequent 
trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict, the error being harmless if the like-
lihood of material influence was not within the realm of rea-
sonable possibility. 
.. ) 
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(13a, 13b] Id. - Appeal- Harmless and Reversible Error-
Impeachment.-Even assuming that a defendant's prior con-
viction had been obtained by an unconstitutional infringement 
of his right to counsel, impeachment of his testimonial credi-
bility by the use of such prior conviction at a subsequent trial 
was not prejudicial per se, nor was the error committed by 
allowing such impeachment over proper objection necessarily 
prejudicial, where it was possible to make a meaningful assess-
ment of prejudice on the record. 
[14] Id.-Appeal-Errors Requiring Reversal-Infringement of 
Basic Constitutional Rights.-There are some constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction, rendering 
impossible a meaningful assessment of prejudice on the record, 
can never be treated as harmless error. 
[16] Arrest-Criminal Cases-Resistance to Arrest.-The legis-
lative intent behind the enactment of Pen. Code, § 834a, was to 
withdraw the former privilege of resistance to an unlawful 
arrest, and, limiting the effect of the statute to cases of actual 
arrest as opposed to detention for questioning, to remove 
disputes as to their legality from the streets to the courtroom. 
[16] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-
Impeachment: Arrest-Criminal Cases-Resistance to Arrest. 
-Under the Ohapman test, the People could not effectively 
claim on ap~al that, by virtue of Pen. Code, § 834a, prohibit-
ing resistance to arrest, a defendant might not have been 
prejudiced by the impeachment of his testimony through the 
potentially erroneous introduction of a prior felony conviction, 
and that a verdict of guilty on two counts of assaUlting police 
officers with intent to commit ~urder (Pen. Code, § 217) and 
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon them (Pen. 
Code, § 245, subd. (b», would necessarily have been reached 
on the strength of defendant's testimony alone, where such 
testimony denied that his gunshots were aimed at persons 
identifiable as police officers or that he intended to injure 
anyone, and would, if believed by the jury, have justified ver-
dicts of no more than simple assault, and where, in any event, 
Pen. Code, § 834a, did not apply to those counts, was not the 
subject of a jury instruction and could not have supported the 
element of intent to injure. 
[17] Id. - Appeal- Impeachment - Error Harmless in View of 
Other Evidence.-Under the Ohapman test, there was no rea-
sonable possibility that the impeachment of defendant's testi-
monial credibility, through the potentially erroneous 
introduction of a prior felony conviction, influenced the jury 
in reaching its verdict of guilt on two counts of assault with a 
deadly weapon upon two police officers (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. 
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 30; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 94. 
) 
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(b», where the officers unequivocally testified that defendant, 
when ordered to drop his weapon and surrender, fired directly 
at them, where, as against defendant's testimony that he did 
so only after being fired upon when trying to surrender, the 
officers had been specifically ordered not to· fire unless first 
fired upon, and where the jury were properly instructed, under 
CALJIC No. 52, that the presumption of truth-telling on the 
part of a witness may be repelled by the interest of the. 
witness in the case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange 
County. William L. Murray, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit murder, for 
assault with a deadly weapon upon police officers, and for being 
armed with a concealed weapon. Judgment of conviction re-
versed witll directions. 
Wiener & Weiss and Robert A. Chrisman for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard H. ~ooper, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
SULLIVAN, J.-Defendant was charged by information 
with four. counts of assault with intent to commit murder 
(Pen. Code, § 217) ; with four counts of assault with a deadly 
weapon upon the person of a police officer (Pen. Code, § 245, 
subd. (b» ; with being armed at the time of said offenses with 
a pistol capable of being concealed upon the person without 
having a license to carry such pistol (see Pen. Code, 
§ 12022) ;1 and with having suffered a prior felony conviction 
in the State of Oklahoma. 
At trial the prosecution produced substantial evidence to 
the following effect: On Saturday, October 31, 1964, about 
5 :30 p.m. Officers Norenberg and Martin of the Anaheim 
Police Department went to the home of defendant to question 
him about an alleged misdemeanor hit-run violation. Failing 
to see the vehicle reported to them as belonging to Coffey, the 
officers parked about a block away and waited. About 6 p.m. 
defendant drove up in a car answering the description given 
IThis charge was not set forth in a separate count but was made by 
reference a part of each of the eight specific counts. (See Pen. Code, 
I 969c.) 
) 
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the police. The officers activated the red lights on their patrol 
car and followed defendant who parked in the driveway, 
emerged from the automobile, and started toward the door of 
his home. 
Officer Norenberg called to defendant that they would like 
to speak to him. Defendant, ignoring the call, entered his 
home and closed the door. The officers walked up to the door 
and knocked upon it several times. Finally defendant's wife 
opened the door and asked what they wanted. Officer Noren-
berg then replied, "We would like to speak to the man who 
was driving this car." Mrs. Coffey inquired as to the purpose 
of their visit. At this point defendant himself appeared and 
told the officers that he would not speak to them unless they 
bad an arrest warrant. Officer Norenberg replied "that we 
could come in there and take him out, if need be." Defendant 
disappeared into a room in the house and returned almost 
immediately with two pistols. Pointing them at the officers, 
who were stinding on the steps, he told them to leave his 
property unless they had a warrant for his arrest. The officers 
began to withdraw, and as they did so defendant "started 
shooting." Officer Martin "felt some debris hit [him] in the 
face" but he and Officer Norenberg retreated unhurt to their 
patrol car and called for assistance.2 
Support arrived almost immediately and a rather extended 
seige was laid to the Coffey residence by some 26 officers who 
proceeded to force defendant's surrender wit~ tear gas. At 
one point defendant appeared on the back patio of his house 
carrying a pistol, whereupon Officer Thompson, stationed in 
this area, called out to him, "Drop your gun and raise your 
hands." In response defendant fired several shots at Officer 
Thompson and at Officer Wilcox standing nearby. Wilcox 
returned defendant's fire as the latter again withdrew into 
the house. 
A short time later, after the police had begun to lob tear 
gas into the house, defendant began crawling out of a 
window. He appeared to have a weapon in his hand and 
Officer Wilcox called out to him to drop it and place his hands 
on his head. Defendant crawled back inside and fired several 
shots at Officer Wilcox and two other officers. Defendant was 
finally overcome by officers who entered the house with gas 
2The above is a summary of testimony given by Officer Martin. Officer 
Norenberg was killed in an airplane crash shortly after the incident in 
question and did not testify at trial. 
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masks. In the final struggle, he received a superficial scalp 
wound; no officers were hurt. 
Of the eight counts charged in the information four related 
to Officers Norenberg and Martin (2 counts, § 217; 2 counts, 
§ 245, subd. (b)). The remaining four counts, charging the 
same crimes,. related to Officers Thompson and Wilcox. 
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity to the offenses charged. He stood mute as to the 
allegation of being armed with an unlicensed concealable 
weapon, and it was stipulated that he therefore denied that 
allegation. He also denied the prior conviction. 
Before the date set for trial defendant moved that. the por-
tion of the information charging him with a prior conviction 
be stricken on the ground that he had been denied his consti-
tutional right to the assistance of counsel in the proceedings 
leading to that conviction. Filed in support of the motion was 
the sworn· declaration of defendant's attorney, which set 
forth the minute entry reflecting defendant's arraignment on 
the 1949 chargeS and summarized further proceedings where-
in defendant, in propria persona, entered a plea of guilty and 
was sentenced to the state prison for five years.' In support of 
the motion defendant filed points and authorities which stated 
that he '.' was indigent at the time of his plea," that he "did 
not understand his right to counsel," and that he "did not 
clearly and expressly and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel. "6 Pursuant to stipulation the motion was placed off 
calendar, reserving to defendant the right to renew it at trial. 
On the morning of the trial, and prior to its commencement, 
the motion was heard in the judge's chambers without a 
reporter. Though the proceedings at that time are therefore 
'The indicated minute entry, dated April 30, 1949, read as follows: 
"The State appearing by ita attorney, H. H. Brown, and the defendants 
[Coffey and a codefendant] appearing in person. The defendants entered 
a plea of guilty. After they were arraigned, they waived everything and 
they were both told of the charge against them and advised of all their 
Constitutional rights. They were bond [8ic] over to District Court of 
Rogers County for trial and their bond [Bic] were set at 11000.00 each." 
'The declaration indicated that the proceedings summarized therein. 
would be established by official records to be introduced at hearing on the 
motion to strike the prior. 
Cilt appears that these all~g:ttioJls formed the basis of an application 
to vacate and set aside the judgment and to withdraw the guilty plea-
said application being filed by defcndnnt in the sentencing Oklahoma 
court some four and one-half mouths after he had been delivered to the 
penitentiary. The court's denial of the motion was affirmed by the Okla-
homa Criminal Court of Appeals on May 23, 1951. (Coffey v. State (1951) 
94 Okla. Crim. 327 [235 P.2d 546].) 
) 
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Dot set forth in the trial transcript, the court's ruling is 
recited in the minutes: "The Court denies the motion without 
a hearing on grounds that under California law, no such 
motion can be entertained as it is irregular (People v. Sulli-
'Van, 206 Cal.App.2d 36 at p. 44 [23 Cal.Rptr. 558])." The 
reporter's transcript indicates that this ruling was based 011 
the lack of statutory authority for such a motion. 
Upon denial of the motion, the court asked defendant 
whether he would like to admit the prior, which he had earlier 
denied. Counsel for defendant replied as follows: "We want 
to admit it reserving the right to pursue whatever remedy is 
available on the motion heretofore heard by the Court with 
respect to striking the priors [sic]." The court thereupon 
stated: "The record will so indicate that you are now admit-
ting the Psior, but that it is not a waiver of any rights that 
you have oti motions heretofore made in denying this or other-
wise attack the validity of this prior." Defendant then, upon 
advice of counsel, admitted the prior conviction. 
In the course of the trial defendant testified in his own 
behalf. Upon cross-examination he was asked whether he had 
been convicted of a felony, and his counsel promptly objected: 
". • • I would like to rephrase the objection we originally 
made on this particular matter for the purposes of the record 
that we might refer to." The court asked whether counsel 
would like to "incorporate by reference. " Counsel replied in 
the affirmative, and the court overruled the objection. Defend-
ant then admitted that he had been convicted of larceny 16 
years before in Oklahoma. In response to further questions, by 
which the prosecutor apparently sought to establish that 
defendant harbored some animosity toward police officers in 
general, defendant represented that he had been "rail-
roaded" in the proceedings leading to the Oklahoma 
conviction. 
The jury found defendant not guilty of the charges set out 
in counts 1 and 2 of the information (assault with intent to 
commit murder upon Officers Thompson and Wilcox). De-
fendant was found guilty of the charges set out in counts 3 
and 4 of the information (assault with intent to commit 
murder upon Officers Norenberg and Martin) and it was also 
found that at the time of committing these offenses (i.e., 
counts 3 and 4) defendant "was armed with a pistol capable 
of being concealed upon the person, without having a license 
or permit to c·arry such firearm." Defendant was also found 
guilty of the charges set out in counts 5 to 8 (assault with a 
I ! 
~ .. 
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deadly weapon upon the persons of all four officers named in 
. . 
the first four counts). Having waived trial by jury on the 
insanity defense, defendant was found by the court to have 
been sane at the time of the offenses and at the time of trial. 
Defendant made a motion for a new trial, the grounds of 
which do not appear in the instant record. At his request the 
hearing on the motion was advanced, whereupon the following 
took place: 
"MR. COLLINS [Attorney for defendant]: ... The Court is 
familiar with the situation here. I believe the People have a 
motion which will issue to Part Four, Title Two, Chapter-
, 'MR. ENRIGHT [Deputy District Attorney]: Yes, your 
Honor, People wish at this time to strike the allegations of the 
Deadly Weapons Section, where there was a separate finding 
on the 12022.6 
"THE COURT: The motion has been read, and let it be 
stricken from the record, and the judgment entered, then. 
"MR. COLLINS: Waive any further time, yo'ur Honor, and 
request sentence at this time. " 
After further colloquy between court and counsel, defend-
ant's counsel withdrew his motion for a new trial and the 
court imposed sentence on count 5 (assault with a deadly 
weapon upon Officer Thompson) and suspended imposition of 
sentence on all other counts. 'I It appears that the court, at the 
6Section 12022 of the Penal Code provides in relevant part that' I Any 
person who commits or attempts to commit any felony ••. while armed 
with any pistol • • . eapable of being concealed upon the person, without 
having a lic(lnse or permit to carry such firearm as provided by this 
chapter, upon conviction of such felony or of an attempt to commit such 
felony, shall in addition to the punishment prescribed for the crime of 
which he has been convicted, be punishable by imprisonment in a state 
prison for not less than five years nor more than 10 years," said addi-
tional term to run consecutively. As indicated above, the finding that 
defendant had been armed with an unlicensed concealable weapon was 
made only in relation to the two counts (3 and 4) wherein defendant was 
found guilty of assault with intent to commit murder. 
'I" THE COURT: Do I understand you wish to abandon your Motion for 
New Trial' 
"MR. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. 
"THE COURT: I just want to make sure. I want to check the jury ver· 
dict and make sure I have it on the right count. 
" . . . . . . . . . . . 
"MR. COLLINS: I believe, your Honor, Count 5, 6, 7 or 8 pertain to 
245-b of the Penal Code, of which he was convicted. 
"THE COURT: Right. I finally found it. There is a lot of paper in this 
file. Count 5. Is there any legal cause why sentence should not he 
imposed' 
"Ma. COLLINS: None whatsoever. 
"THE COURT: On Count 5 of thc Infonnation, as to which defendant 
has been adjudged Guilty by the verdict of the jury, I sentence the de-
~) 
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time of pronouncing sentence or shortly thereafter, purported 
to amend the information on its face in accordance with the 
above-mentioned motion of the district attorney. We have set 
forth the information as amended in the footnote. s 
The minutes of the court reflect the motion of the district 
attorney, the amendment of the information, and the rendi-
tion of judgment, in the following language: "Motion by the 
People to strike the deadly weapon section. Motion granted. 
The Information was amended by striking 'deadly weapon' 
and inserting the words 'dangerous weapon.' The motion for 
a new trial is withdrawn. No legal cause appearing why judg-
-ment should not now be pronounced, it is the judgment of the 
Court that the defendant be sentenced to the State Prison for 
the wrm prescribed by law on Count 5. The imposition of 
sentence is suspended on Counts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8." Appar-
ently no reference was made at this time to the prior con-
viction. 
The amended abstract of judgment described the crime 
upon which defendant was sentenced as follows: "Assault 
upon a Police Officer with a Dangerous Weapon, a lesser and 
included offense contained in Sec. 245b of the Penal Code of 
the State of California in violation of Section 245b of thb 
Penal Code of the State of California . . ."9 The abstract 
tendant to the State Penitentiary tor the term prescribed by law. The 
Court suspends the imposition of sentence on aU other counts as to which 
the defendant has been convicted." 
8In the copy of the information appearing ill the clerk's traliscript on 
appeal counts 5 through 8 charge defendant with "Violation of Section 
2451.1 of the Pena\. Code of the State of California (Assault Peace Officer 
with a <PUiJI:J ~t';()'/l (ldangerous weapon/) [not initialed]), in that 
on or about the 31st day of October, 1964, in the County of Orange, State 
of California, the said ODIE WILLARD COFFEY did willfully, unlawfully 
nnd feloniously assault [named officer] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a 
pistol, at a time when the said [named officer] was a peace officer engaged 
ill the performance of his duties and such fact was known and reasonably 
should have been known by the said ODIE WILLARD CorRY." No altera-
tion was made as to counts 3 and 4. and the paragraph charging viola-
tion of section 12022 was left unchanged. 
9Section 245, subdivision (b). provides in relevant part that" Evel'y 
person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or instrument or by 
any means likely to produce great bodily injury upon the person of a 
I)cace officer ... and who knows or reasonably should know that such 
victim is a peace officer ... engaged in the performance of his duties, 
when such peace officer ... is engaged in the performance of his duties 
shall be puuisllcd by imprisonment ill the state prison not exceeding 15 
years; provided, that if such person hus previously been convicted of a 
felony under the laws of this state or has previously been convicted of 
an offense under the laws of any other state or of the United States 
which, if committed in tMs state, would have been punishable as a felony, 
he shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five years 
to life." 
, ~ 
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then recited defendant's prior conviction and went on as 
follows: "Defendant was charged and was found to have been 
armed with a dangerous weapon at the time of commission of 
the offense, or a concealed dangerous weapon at the time of 
his arrest within the meaning of Penal Code Sections 96ge 
and 3024. "10 . 
[1, 2] We deal first with the manifest difficulties pre-
sented by the record of judgment herein. We have concluded 
that the court's abortive attempt to reflect in the information 
and judgment the ambiguous motion of the district attorney 
has resulted in a judgment and record so confused and uncer-
tain as to render meaningful analysis impossible. This state of 
the record, together with the fact that the court's action 
represents a purported exercise of discretionary powers as to 
sentencing, precludes present modification or correction by 
this court. (cf. People v. Baca (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 487, 
489-498 [55 Cal.Rptr. 681]), and we must therefore reverse 
the judgment with directions to undertake again all such pro-
ceedings as may be necessary, or as may be raised by proper 
future motions of the parties, subsequent to the entry of the 
jury verdicts herein. 
Defendant further urges that the trial court should not 
have refused to hear his pretrial motion to strike the. prior 
conviction. We agree. . 
[3] The right to the assistance of counsel at trial, the 
scope of which was enunciated in Gideon v. Wainwright 
(1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799,83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 
733], applies retrospectively without regard to time. (Dough-
ty v. Ma·xwell (1964) 376 U.S. 202 [11 L.Ed.2d 650, 84 S.Ct. 
702] ; United States v. LaVallee (2d Cir. 1964) 330 Jr.2d 303, 
310-312; In re Woods (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 3, 5-6 [48 Cal.Rptr. 
689,409 P.2d 913].) [4] Further, to the extent that statu-
lOSection 96ge provides that "Whenever a defendant is armed with a 
firearm or other weapon under such circumstances as to bring said de-
fendant within the operation of Section 3024 of the Penal Code relating 
to certain minimum penalties or of Section 12022 of the Penal Code,' I 
that fact may be charged in the accusatory pleading, setting forth the 
nature of the weapon, and must be separately determined at the trial. 
Section 3024 provides in relevant part for certain minimum penalties 
as to one armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the offense, or 
possessing a concealed deadly weapon at the time of his arrest. The sec-
tion goes on to define a deadly weapon "to include any instrument or 
weapon of the kind commouly known as a blackjack, slung shot, billy, 
sandclub, sand hag, metal knuckl('s, any dirk, dagger, pistol, revolver, or 
any otlier firearm, any knife havillg a blade longer than five inches, any 
razor with an unguarded blade and any metal pipe or bar used or intended 
to be used as a club." ( Italics added.) 
Section 12022 is set forth in relevant part at fn. 6, ante. 
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tory machinery relating to penal status or severity of sanction 
is activated by the presence of prior convictions, it is impera-
tive that the constitutional basis of such convictions be 
examined if challenged by proper allegations. (In re nToods, 
supra, 64 Cal.2d 3; cf. In re Streeter (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 47 
[56 Cal.Rptr. 824, 423 P.2d 976].) [5] The fact that a 
.prior conviction was sustained in another jurisdiction does 
not preclude such examination. "To the extent that any State 
makes its penal sanctions depend in part on the f.act of prior 
convictions elsewhere, necessarily it must assume the burden 
of meeting attacks on the constitutionality of such prior con-
victions." (United States v. Jackson (2d Cir. 1957) 250 F.2d 
349,355; see I'll re Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3, 5.) 
,6a] Though these principles were first given application 
in a series of cases involving collater·al attacks on final judg-
ments (In re Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3; I'll re Luce (1966) 64 
Ca1.2d 11 [48 Cal.Rptr. 694, 409 P.2d 918] ; I'll re Tucke1' 
(1966) 64 Ca1.2d 15 [48 Cal.Rptr. 697, 409 P.2d 921]), it is 
clearly in the interest of efficient judicial administration that 
attacks upon the constitutional basis of prior convictions be 
disposed of at the earliest possible opportunity, and we are 
therefore of the view that, if the issue is properly raised at or 
prior to trial, it must be determined by the trial court. Weare 
further of the view that the procedure here sought to be 
utilized, to wit, a motion to strike the prior before trial, is a 
proper method by which to raise the issue and initiate proceed-
ings to determine the constitutional va1idity of the prior 
conviction.ll 
[7] We emphasize, however, that the issue must be raised 
by means of allegations which, if true, would render the prior 
conviction devoid of constitutional support. "One seeking to 
challenge prior convictions charged against him may do so 
only through a clear allegation to the effect that, in the pro-
ceedings leading to the prior conviction under attack, he 
'neither was represented by counsel nor waived the n:ght to be 
so represented." (Original italics.) (People V. Merriam, 
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 390, 397 [58 Cal.Rptr. 1, 426 P.2d 161].) 
[Sa] In the instant case defendant, by means of his notice 
llThe constitutional basis of the inquiry at issue requires that a de-
fendant be permitted to initiate the indicated proceedings even in those 
cases wherein the Legislature has determined that the striking of prior 
convictions can occur only upon motion of the prosecutor. (See Health 
& Sni. Code, § 11718; People V. Sidener (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 645 [25 Cal. 
Rptr. 697,375 P.2d 641].) 
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of motion, points and authorities, and declaration of attorney, 
clearly alleged that he was not represented by counsel in the 
course of the 1949 Oklahoma proceedings. He further alleged 
that he "did not clearly and expressly and intelligently 
waive his right to counseL" 
The Attorney General contends that the latter allegation 
does not constitute an allegation of nonwaiver as required by 
Merriam. He relies upon the case of People v. DeJean (1967) 
249 Cal.App.2d 220 [57 Cal.Rptr. 211]. There defendant 
was charged with a violation of section 11501 of the Health 
and Safety Code and with three prior convictions, two of 
which were for violation of federal narcotics laws. He admit-
ted the prior convictions and was found guilty of the substan-
tive offense.12 On appeal he, for the first time, alleged that in 
the proceedings leading to the two prior federal narcotics 
convictions he " 'did not have assistance of counsel, and did 
not knowi'lyly waive any such assistance.'" (P. 233.) The 
Court of Appeal undertook an examination of the records of 
the prior convictions and determined that defendant had 
waived his right to counsel as to each. The defendant's alle-
gation that such waiver was not entered into "knowingly" 
was considered too conclusory to merit a present factual 
inquiry--:-especially in light of the facts (1) that defendant 
offered no evidentiary support for the allegation and (2) that 
the records clearly showed that defendant had been expressly 
advised of his rights to counsel and had expressly waived the 
same. (People v. DeJean, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 220, 231-234.) 
The De Jean case cannot bear the weight sought to be placed 
upon it by the Attorney General. First, the determination 
there undertaken by the Court of Appeal is clearly one of the 
nature sought to be prevented by our decision in People v. 
Merriam, supra, 66 Ca1.2d 390.13 Second, it is clear that the 
Court of Appeal in DeJean confused the matter of raising the 
relevant issue with that of resolving it. [9] Defendant 
DeJean's allegation that he had not waived counsel "know-
ingly" must clcarly be considered an allegation of non-
waiver, for a relinquishment of rights unaccompanied by a 
state of mind capable of appreciating the implications and 
12Section 11501 provides that the penalty for a first violation shall be 
five years to life with a minimum of three years actual time served. The 
penalty for violation with two prior narcotics offenses is 15 years to lite 
witb a minimum of 15 years actual time served. 
13In fairness to the Court of Appeal, it sbould be noted that the deci· 
sion in DeJeOl1l. preceded by more than a month our deciaion in Merriam. 
) 
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consequences of such action is not a waiver of such rights.14 
The fact that the allegation was made" without the slightest 
suggestion from him of any fact in support of that conclu-
sion" (People v. DeJean, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 220, 233) is 
relevant not to the raising of the issue, but rather to the failure 
of defendant DeJean to produce evidence in support of it. 
[8b] We hold that the allegations made by defendant in 
support of his motion to strike the 1949 Oklahoma prior 
conviction were sufficient to justify a hearing in the trial 
court for the purpose of determining whether, in the proceed-
ings leading to that conviction, defendant was accorded his 
P right to counsel in accordance with the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
[6b] Although the facts of this case do not call upon us to 
delineate the nature of the contemplated hearing, we do so for 
the guidance of courts and counsel who will be called upon to 
deal with similar matters in the future: First, when a defend-
ant,' whether by motion to strike the prior conviction or 
convictions on constitutional grounds, or by denial of such 
prior conviction or convictions on constitutional grounds at 
the time of entering his plea to the same, raises the issue for 
determination, the court shall, prior to trial, hold a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury in order to determine the 
constitutional validity of the charged prior or priors in 
issue. [10] Second, in the course of such hearing the prose-
cutor shall first have the burden of producing evidence of the 
prior conviction sufficient to justify a finding that defendant 
"has suffered such previous conviction." (Pen. Code, 
§ 1025.) Third, when this prima facie showing has been made, 
the defendant shall thereupon have the burden of producing 
evidence that his constitutional right to counsel was infringed 
in the prior proceeding at issue.15 Fourth, if defendant bears 
this burden, the prosecution shall have the right to produce 
evidence in rebuttal. [6e] Fifth, the court shall make a 
finding Qn the basis of the evidence thus produced and shall 
14Compare the following language of the United States Supreme Court: 
"The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence 
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and 
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver." (Italics 
added.) (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 516 [8 L.Ed.2d 70, 
82 S.Ot. 884].) 
15Though the burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the charged 
prior conviction remains with the prosecution, and the burden of produc-
ing evidence rests initially with it, the latter burden shifts to the defend-
ant upon proof of the fact of his having" suffered" the prior conviction. 
(See Evid. Code, § 550.) 
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strike from the accusatory pleading any prior conviction 
found to be constitutionally invalid. 
Our holding that the trial court should have heard defend. 
ant's motion to strike the prior conviction does not, of c~urse, 
necessarily require that there be an entire new trial. If, upon 
remand, the trial court determines that no violation of 
defendant's right to counsel occurred in the course of the 
1949 Oklahoma proceedings, it should, in accordance with that 
portion of this opinion dealing with ambiguity in the record 
of judgment, undertake necessary and proper proceedings 
subsequent to the entry of the jury verdicts. In the event, 
however, that it is determined that the 1949 conviction is 
invalid, the question then arises whether the use to which that 
conviction was put at trial was improper. 
It should first be noted that the prosecution's use at trial of 
defendant.'s prior conviction can be viewed as serving two 
purposes. First, the fact of the conviction was utilized to 
impeach defendant's credibility after he had testified in his 
own defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051; see Evid. Code, 
§ 788.)18 Second, defendant's subjective reaction to that 
conviction was utilized to show motive for the offenses for 
which defendant was on trial in the instant case. It would 
seem, however, that the latter evidence would be properly 
admissible even if the prior conviction were constitutionally 
invalid, for the validity or invalidity of the judgment of 
conviction is not relevant to the question of defendant's atti. 
tudes and motives at the time of the incident for which he was 
on trial in California. Therefore, if the prior was in fact 
invalid, its only possible prejudicial effect upon the defense 
lay in the impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility. 
[11] We are convinced that the use of a constitutionally 
invalid prior conviction to impeach testimonial credibility is 
improper, and that to allow such impeachment is error under 
California law. (Cf. People v. Hamilton (1948) 33 Cal.2d 45, 
50 [198 P.2d 873] ; Macfarlane v. Deparfment of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control (1958) 51 Ca1.2d 84, 89 [330 P.2d 769] ; 
People v. Banks (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 370, 382, fn. 7 [1 Cal.Rptr. 
669, 348 P.2d 102].) [12a] Further, we are of the view 
that such error is of federal constitutional dimension. It is 
clear that a conviction of crime, no matter when sustained, is 
16The jury was properly instructed as follows: "The fact that a wit· 
ness had been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be considered 
by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging the credibility of that 
witness~ •.• " (CALJIC No. 54-B.) 
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constitutionally invalid if it was obtained in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 
supra, 372 U.S. 335; Doughty v. Maxwell, supm, 376 U.S. 
202; United States v. LaVallee, supra, 330 F.2d 303; In rc 
Woods, supra, 64 Ca1.2d 3.) We think it equally clear that the 
utilization of such a conviction, at the trial of a subsequent 
offense, for any purpose leading to a conviction for such 
subsequent offense, is violative of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, in assessing the prejudi-
cial effect of such erroneous utilization, we are required to 
apply the test recently set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 
L.Ed.2d 705, 87 8.Ct. 824]. 
[lSa] Preliminary to applying the indicated test in the 
instant case, we reject defendant's contention that impeach-
ment by means of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction is 
per se prejudicial, and that error committed through allowing 
such impeachment over proper objection cannot be considered 
harmless under any circumstances. [14] "Although... 
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error, [fn. 
omitted]" (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 23), 
those rights are by their nature such that their infraction 
renders impossible a meaningful assessment of prejudice on 
the record.17 [13b] Such assessment is quite possible in the 
instant case, and we therefore undertake the indicated task in 
light of the entire record before us. [12b] Our inquiry, as 
indicated above, is whether the prosecution has proved "be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the error complained. of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman v. California, 
supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
As we have recently pointed out, the Chapman rule, wllile 
requiring that we look beyond the probability of a different 
result absent constitutional error, does not demand that a 
conviction be reversed" for the sole reason that we might be 
fible to conceive of some possibility, however remote, that a 
jury c01lld have been marginally influenced" by such error. 
(People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 712 [59 Cal. 
Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) Rather, the rule requires reversal 
17Among the indicated rights is that of the right to counsel at tria1. 
(Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. 335.) It must be emphasized, 
however, that we are not here concerned with the bare right to counsel; 
rather we are concerned with a derivative right to remain free from 
impeachment of testimonial credibility by means of prior convictions 
ohtained in vio]q,tion of the right to counsel. 
L) 
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if, upon an examination of the entire record, it appears rea-
sonably possible that the error might have materially influ-
enced the jury in arriving at its verdict, and the error must 
be considered harmless if the likelihood of material influence 
is not within the realm of reasonable possibility. In the 
circumstances of the instant case, the application of the indi-
cated standard requires that we direct our attention to 
defendant's courtroom testimony. 
Defendant testified in substance that on the day in question 
he left his place of business in the late afternoon and, after 
stopping briefly at a tavern, became involved in a minor auto-
mobile collision; that, after giving proper identification and 
again visiting a tavern, he drove to his home; that two police 
officers came to his home and demanded that he accompany 
them to police headquarters for questioning; that, when he 
refused to. comply with this demand in the absence of a war-
rant, the officers commenced to curse at him in the presence of 
his wife and children and one of them forced his way into . 
defendant's home; that, when the officers refused to leave his 
property, he got and exhibited two pistols in order to compel 
them to leave; that when they still refused, he fired several 
shots through a window in order to frighten them away; that, 
upon the· arrival of additional police, he attempted to sur-
render but was fired upon and withdrew into the house, mean-
while returning fire in the general direction from which the 
shots had come; that later, after the house had been filled 
with tear gas, he attempted to leave through a window, but he 
heard two shotgun blasts and withdrew into the house, again 
returning fire in the general direction from which the blasts 
had come; and that he was finally overcome by tear gas and 
subdued by officers who entered his house. Defendant empha-
sized that he at no time had any intention of injuring or 
taking the life of any police officer, and that he never aimed 
his weapon at any person identifiable by him as such. 
It is the contention of the Attorney General that even if we 
take defendant's testimony at face value, the elements of each 
of the crimes of which he was found guilty are established 
therein, and that therefore he could not have been prejudiced 
by impeachment. Reliance is placed upon section 834a of the 
Penal Code, which provides as follows: "If a person has 
Imowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have 
knowledge, that he is being arrested by a police officer, it is 
the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any 
weapon to resist such arrest." [15] [See fns. 18, 19.] The 
..\.tll.)rn~y G~lll!ral urg~ that ill \·i~w of the duty created by 
;;;...- -/.--)-. 
) 
July 1967] PEoPLE v. COFFEY 221 
(8'1 C.2d 204; 60 Cal.Rptr. 457. 430 P.2d 15] 
this statute,18 defendant's actions rendered him criminally 
liable for the crimes of which he was found guilty-even if 
the circumstances provoking those actions were in fact as he 
alleged in his testimony. 
There are three answers to this contention. First, section 
834a concerns itself with arrest, not with detention for ques-
tioning.19 [16] Since there was no evidence adduced at 
trial to the effect that an arrest was in progress prior to 
defendant's initial burst of gunshots, section 834a could at 
most be applicable to the two counts involving Officers Wilcox 
and Thompson. 
Second, we note that the jury was. not instructed as to 
section 834a, and we think that this fact precludes the Attor-
ney General from having recourse to the section in order to 
show that the error here in question would be harmless. The 
question here is that of the effect of error upon a jury 
instructed as the jury herein was instructed-not the effect of 
such error upon a jury instructed as the People would now 
prefer that it had been instructed. 
Third and finally, defendant testified at trial that he had no 
intention of harming or killing anyone and that he at no time 
aimed his gunshots at any person identifiable by him as such. 
It would seem clear that if defendant's testimony on this 
point were believed by the jury, it could not properly find 
violations of section 217 or section 245, subdivision (b), of the 
18Prior to the adoption of section 834a by the 1957 Legislature, it was 
the general rule that an officer making an unlawful arrest was not engaged 
in the proper discharge of his duties and could be l'esisted by means of 
reasonable foree. (See People v. Spinosa (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 659, 
664 [252 P.2d 409]; Jackson v. Superior Cour~ (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 
183, 189 [219 P.2d 879]; People v. Perry (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 
906, 914 [180 P.2d 465].) The enactment of section 834a clearly repre-
sents an effort to remove disputes as to the legality of arrest from the 
street to the courtroom and it has been properly held that the indicated 
privilege of resistance is no longer the law of California. (In re Bacon 
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 52-53 [49 Cal.Rptr. 322]; People v. Burns 
(1961) 198 Cal.App.2d Supp. 839 [18 Ca1.Rptr. 921].) 
19We do not reach this conclusion wholly by reference to the maxim 
ezpressio ttnitts est ezclusio alterius. The report of the Senate Interim 
Judiciary Committee concerned with the passage of section 834a, of 
which we take judicial notice for the purpose of statutory interpretation 
(see Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d cd. 1966) § 154, pp. 148-149), clearly 
shows that the statute, as originally referred to committee, forbade force-
ful resistance by one who knows 01' should know "that he is being 
stopped, detainell for questioning, or arrested by a peace officer, .•. " 
(Italics added.) (Fourth Progress Report to the Legislature by the 
Senate Interim .Judiciary Committee (1957), Appendix to .Journal of the 
Senate, vol. 1, pp. 426-427.) 'rllC deletion of the emphasized language ill 
the statute as finally passed indicates a clear legislative intention that the 
effeet of section 834a be limited to eases of actual arrest. 
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Penal Code, for basic to the indicated varieties of aggravated 
assault is the crime of simple assault.20 "An assault is an 
unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a 
violen t injury on the person of another." (Pen. Code, § 240.) 
"One could not very well 'attempt' or try to 'commit' an 
injury on the person of another if he had no intent to cause 
any injury to such other person .... The crime here in-
volved, if defendant's testimony is accepted as true, would 
seem to be a misdemeanor. 'Every person who, except in self-
defense, in the presence of any other person, draws or exhibits 
any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any other deadly 
weapon whatsoever, in a rude, angry or threatening manner, 
or who in any manner, unlawfully u~es the same in any fight 
or quarrel is guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Pen. Code, 
§ 417.) "21 (People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 768, 775 [228 
P.2d 281].) Even if the jury had been instructed as to section 
834a of the Penal Code, it is clear that a breach of the duty of 
submission imposed by that section, absent any intent to cause 
injury to a police officer, could not result in aggravated 
assault of the varieties here charged. 
For these reasons we must reject the contention of the 
Attorney General that, because 'defendant's testimony itself 
establishes' all elements of the crimes of which he was found 
guilty, no prejudice could result from erroneous i;m.peachment 
by means of a constitutionally invalid prior. As we have 
shown, the vital element of intent to injure is certainly not 
established by that testimony, and section 834a, even if it 
were here applicable to all crimes at issue, could not supply 
such intent. We therefore turn now to an assessment of the 
effect of impeachment upon the jury's findings as to the 
crucial elements of intent. 
For 'these purposes it is helpful to consider in two cate-
gories the crimes of which defendant was found guilty. The 
first category is comprised of counts 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the 
information: assault with intent to commit murder (§ 217) 
against Officers Norenberg and Martin, and assault with a 
deadly weapon upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (b» against 
the same persons.22 In the second category are counts 5 and 
20Tbe jury was properly so instructed. 
:!lTliC jury hercin was properly instructed that. section 417 sets forth a 
leslie I" offense necelillarily included in those charged. (Cf. People v. Wilson 
(1967) 66 Ca1.2d 749, 757-761 [59 Cu1.Rptr. 156,427 P.2d 820].) 
220ur examination of tllC record convinces us that t.he four counts in-
volving Norenherg and Martin (3, 4, 7, 8) all relate only to the single 
incident at defendant's front door. 
~ 
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6: assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer against 
Officers Wilcox and Thompson. 
As to the first category we note that the record contains no 
direct evidence to the effect that defendant intended to 
murder or harm Norenberg or Martin. Defendant's testimony 
expressly disclaims any such intent, and the testimony of 
Officer Martin offers only circumstantial support which, 
though certainly sufficient to support the finding of the jury, 
is nevertheless weak. For instance, Officer ~Iartin testified that 
after defendant had asked the officers to leave he appeared 
with the pistols and pointed them" at" them, and that as the 
officer began to withdraw defendant "started shooting." 
Nowhere does Officer Martin state, as fact or opinion, that 
defendant was directing his fire at them. Defendant's testi-
mony was that he fired through the window alongside the 
open front door in order to scare the officers, and the testi-
mony of Officer Martin is supportive of this statement in that 
he testified that he was struck by some "debris," presumably 
broken glass, immediately after the first shots were fired. 
Assuming that defendant's prior Oklahoma conviction is 
determined to be invalid, we are of the view that, under the 
above state of the evidence, there is a reasonable possibility 
that erroneous impeachment of defendant's testimonial credi-
bility by means of such prior conviction materially influenced 
the jurY in arriving at its verdicts as to counts 3, 4, 7, and 8; 
we therefore conclude as to these counts that the prosecution 
has not proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
(Ohapman v. Oalifornia, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
[17] As to the second category, the assault with a deadly 
weapon 'upon Officers Wilcox and Thompson, there was precise 
and unequivocal testimony by the officers involved that 
defendant, when requested to drop his weapon and surrender" 
turned and fired directly at them. Further, there was physical 
evidence to the effect that bullets fired at this time by defend-
ant struck very near the officers. Defendant's story, of course, 
was that the officers opened fire upon him when he was trying 
to surrender, and that he returned their fire and ran back into 
the house. However, there was also evidence to the effect that 
the officers were under explicit instructions not to fire upon 
defendant unless fired upon. We also consider the fact that 
the jury was properly instructed that the presumption of 
truth-telling on the part of a witness may be repelled by the 
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interest of that witness in the case.23 Assuming that defend-
ant's prior Oklahoma conviction is determined to be invalid, 
and viewing the evidence and instructions as a whole, we are 
of the view that there is no reasonable possibility that erro-
neous impeachment of defendant's testimonial credibility by 
means of such prior conviction materially influenced the jury 
in arriving at its verdicts as to counts 5 and 6; we therefore 
conclude as to these counts that the prosecution has proved 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained." (Chapman v. Cali-
f()rnia, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.)24 
Defendant finally contends that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the verdicts. We deem it too clear to warrant 
extended discussion that the testimony of the several officers 
here involved, if believed, was generously ample to support 
the verdicts rendered. 
It appears from the foregoing that the judgment must be 
reversed. Upon remand the trial court is directed to hear "and 
determine defendant's motion to strike the prior conviction 
on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. If it determines that the prior 
conviction is constitutionally valid, the trial court is further 
directed to reinstate the jury verdicts and undertake all 
, 
23The instruction given, CALJIC No. 52, 'provides in relevant part as 
follows: ' 'The character of the witnesses, as shown by the evidence, 
should be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining their 
credibility, that is whether or not they have spoken the truth. The jury 
may scrutinize the manner of witnesses while on the stand, and may con-
sider their relation to the case. if any. and also their degree of intelli-
gence. A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption, how-
ever. may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies; his interest in 
the ease. if any. or his bias or prejudice. if any, for or against one or any 
of the parties; by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting 
ltis character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by contradictory evi-
dence." 
24Distinguishable from the case at bench is PeopZe v. Torre. (1964) 61 
Ca1.2d 264 [37 Cal.Rptr. 889, 391 P.2d 161]. There the exclusion of evi-
dence relating to an alibi defense as to one count of the indictment W88 
Itl'hI to be pre.iudicial error, and we further held that the error, although 
)lot I"elating directly to the alibi defense as to an additional count, was 
also prejudieial as to that count. We reasoned that defendant's credi-
bility was in issue as to both counts and that" the atmosphere of falsity 
infected the whole of his defense." (61 Ca1.2d at p. 268.) However, 
although the TOfTe. opinion does not explicitly outline the testimony 88 
to the additional count, we think it a fair inference that the evidence was 
cloijcly balanced as to the identity of the wrongdoer, and that thereforo 
the admission of evidence erroneously excluded might have tipped the 
balance in favor of the defendant. In the instant case, on the other hand, 
we evaluf-te the effect of evidence not excluded but erroneously admitted, 
nnd we conclude as to counts 5 and 6 that, in view of the convincing and 
extensive evidence produced by the prosecution, there is no reasonable 
possibili~ that lueh erroneous admission contributed to the nrdicta. 
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subsequent proceedings as may be necessary in the premises or 
rendered proper by motions of the parties. If it determines 
that the prior conviction is constitutionally invalid, the trial 
court is directed (1) to reinstate the jury verdicts as to 
counts 5 and 6 and to undertake all subsequent proceedings as 
may be necessary in the premises or rendered proper by 
motions of the parties as to those counts, and (2) to proceed 
according to law upon counts 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the information. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings under the directions and in 
conformity with the views herein expressed. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Concurring and Dissenting. 
I concur in the judgment and the opinion of the court 
except for the holding that an· erroneous impeachment of 
defendant by an unconstitutional prior felony conviction 
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to counts 5 
and 6. 
Although there is more evidence of felonious intent on 
counts 5 and 6 than on counts 3, 4, 7, and 8, there is a direct 
conflict on all counts between defendant's testimony and the 
prosecution's evidence of felonious intent. Since any evidence 
introduced to impeach defendant's credibility would apply to 
all counts, it is highly unlikely that a jury would assess 
defendant's credibility on a count-by-count basis. (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 3.) When a defendant's credibility is 
in issue, error affecting his credibility as to any count neces-
sarily affects all counts in which credibility is in issue. (People 
v. Torres, 61 Ca1.2d 264,267 [37 Cal.Rptr. 889, 391 P.2d 161].) 
If, as the majority opinion correctly concludes, the jury might 
not have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that de-
fendant's testimony was false as to counts 3~ 4, 7, and 8, in the 
absence of the impeaching evidence, it likewise might not have 
been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 
. testimony was false as to counts 5 and 6. 
Peters, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
21, 1967. Traynor, C. J., and Peters, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
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